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The Ties of Place
Contractors and Employer Strategies on theWestern
Canadian and Central Queensland Coalfields
BRADLEY BOWDEN
This study explores the ways in which spatial configurations 
have shaped the use of contractors in the export coalfields of 
Queensland (Australia) and western Canada since the late 1960s. 
It is argued that the divergent employer strategies pursued after 
1996—whereby Queensland producers dramatically increased 
their use of contractors while their Canadian counterparts did 
not—reflects their different spatial placement within the global 
coal trade. In Canada, the main problem was locational disadvan-
tage due to distance from deep-water. In consequence, employers 
responded to falling prices by concentrating production in the 
area of greatest locational advantage. For Queensland producers, 
the issue was high mine-site labour costs. In this context, using 
contractors was part of a strategy to transform labour relations 
through the Workplace Relations Act.
In 1892, Alfred Marshall reflected on how, in business, the “tendency 
to variation is a chief cause of progress.” Explaining patterns of variation 
was, however, no easy task. As Marshall (1932: 205) remarked: “Every 
locality has incidents of its own which affect in various ways the methods 
of . . . every class of business that is carried on in it.” To complicate  matters 
further, while in some trades, “the possible variations are confined within 
narrow limits,” in others “there can be great variations.” Although the 
processes of globalization have, by common consent, worked to undermine 
the stable employment relationships that characterized the post-1945 era, 
explaining patterns of variation remains a key task in industrial relations. 
Despite attempts to depict the current world order as “a borderless economy” 
– BOWDEN, B., Griffith Business School, Griffith University, Nathan, Queensland, Australia, 
b.bowden@griffith.edu.au.
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(Ohmae 1995: 64), spatial barriers, national borders and local circumstance 
remain industrial and economic realities. For instance, one recent neo- liberal 
study of international trade (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999: 325) 
notes: “The real world is anything but seamless: It remains separated by 
oceans and deserts, by cultural and language differences, and by national 
boundaries that continue to impose substantial practical  obstacles to trade.” 
This same study (1999: 239) also concluded that, despite trade liberaliza-
tion, the United States-Canadian border “imposes barriers to arbitrage 
 comparable to 1,700 miles of physical space.” Such observations reinforce 
the theoretical contributions made by radical economic geographers since 
the 1980s (Herod 1991, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2001; Massey 1994; Harvey 
1982, 1989, 2001; Peck 1996; Smith 1984). Although these theorists are 
divided over the relative contributions of capital and labour to the construc-
tion of what Harvey (1982: 421) calls the “historical geography of capital-
ism,” they are broadly united in conceiving the latter as “a social process” 
whereby “productive forces and social relations . . . exist as particular spatial 
configurations.”
This study explores the ways in which “particular spatial configurations” 
have shaped the use of contactors in the export coalfields of Queensland 
(Australia) and western Canada since the late 1960s. During these years, 
Central Queensland and western Canadian producers assumed a dominant 
position in the international trade in the high grade coking coal used in steel 
making. By 2000–01, Central Queensland was exporting a record 76 million
tonnes, their only serious competition the 27 million tonnes supplied by 
Canada (Coal Services 2001: 1; Coal Association of Canada 2003: 1). While 
the demand for coking coal from East Asia’s steel mills underpinned the 
expansion of the seaborne trade, the resultant production system rested on 
a complex set of social relationships, whereby vast sums of capital and 
thousands of workers and their families were settled in relatively remote 
locations. At all times in this system’s creation and maintenance, national 
and provincial governments played a decisive role. Not only did they expend 
billions of dollars on transport and social infrastructure, governments also 
provided the labour relations framework within which employment terms 
were negotiated. For miners and their unions, the issue of outsourcing was 
of particular significance, given the lack of alternative sources of employ-
ment. Not surprisingly, the various coal unions made the regulation of 
contractors an early objective in both regions, imposing almost identical 
restrictions on management.
If high coal prices and labour shortages initially provided a favourable 
circumstance for regulating contractors, a sustained fall in prices, which 
dropped from US$75 per tonne in 1983 to US$37.60 in 2000, undermined 
the industry’s earlier prosperity. As part of their response to falling prices, 
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after 1996 Central Queensland’s coal owners repudiated previously negoti-
ated agreements restricting their use of contractors. In the wake of these 
repudiations, the number of contractors rose from insignificant levels to 
more than one-third of the workforce (QDNRM 2003). By contrast, Cana-
dian pits continued their historic reliance on employee miners. Given that 
both Queensland and Canadian mining operations were subject to the same 
global pressures, the key question is: to what can we ascribe variations in 
employers’ labour relations strategies with regard to use of contractors after 
1996? In exploring answers to this question, this article finds the analytic 
framework provided by Harvey (1982, 1989, 1991) particularly useful. 
While others (Peet 1983; Herod 1991, 1994) have emphasized capital’s 
mobility and capacity for “flight,” Harvey has highlighted the ways in 
which productive capital, as well as labour, is geographically embedded. As 
Harvey (1989: 234) has observed: “When either capitalists or workers have 
important assets fixed and immobile in space, then neither side is in a good 
position to use powers of geographical mobility against the other.” Such 
insights have particular relevance to this study on two grounds. Firstly, in 
coal mining we are dealing with an industry where capital investments are 
physically fixed in the ground. Secondly, the crisis that beset the industry 
during the 1990s was the result not just of prior economic over-expansion, 
but also of geographical over-expansion, as mining was extended into what 
were, at best, marginal fields.
This article argues that an understanding of the strategies pursued 
by coal owners requires, first and foremost, a comprehension of the 
 different historical geographies in which they found themselves. In Central 
 Queensland, producers retained a position of relative locational advantage 
in the international coal trade. In these circumstances, in situ solutions were 
sought. The central feature of this Australian response was the successful 
utilization of the Workplace Relations Act, 1996 (WRA) to reshape local 
labour markets and industrial practices. By contrast, Canadian producers 
primarily reacted to the crisis by engaging in a process of geographic and 
organizational concentration that involved the abandonment of virtually 
all export operations outside British Columbia’s Elk Valley. Although, 
for miners outside the Elk Valley, this process involved a loss of employ-
ment, for those within the Valley it meant the retention of their strong local 
bargaining position.
AN “UNOBTAINABLE DREAM”: CONTRACTORS AND THE 
HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF LABOUR RELATIONS
Addressing a United States symposium on contracting, Perry (1997: 
532) remarked that: “The outsourcing of work either diffuses or diminishes 
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union membership.” Others have likewise concluded that the ability of 
unions to counteract outsourcing and contracting is vital to the maintenance 
of effective collective bargaining patterns. In Canada, for example, Verge 
(2000: 281) has noted that corporate use of “networks of micro-enterprises” 
to reorganize production “is certainly bound to undermine the traditional 
collective bargaining regime.” At times, however, there has been a tendency 
to view the increase in outsourcing as an inevitable, universal trend. Two 
United States’ commentators have, for instance, noted: “There was a time, 
not so long ago, when the work of firms was done by employees of the firm. 
. . . For more and more working men and women, such a stable, long-term 
employment relationship with decent wages and benefits has become an 
unobtainable dream” (Hiatt and Jackson 1997: 488).
The growing literature of radical human and economic geography, 
highlighted in the introduction to this article, provides a useful antidote 
to such determinism. As Peck (1996: 266) remarked, “regimes of labour 
regulation have a tendency to take on distinctive local forms.” In taking this 
stance, these scholars are not arguing, as Massey (1994: 62) has emphasized, 
that each spatial distribution (nation, region, city) has its “own autonomous 
existence.” Instead, to cite Peck again (1996: 250), it is recognized that 
“local fortunes remain immensely vulnerable to macroeconomic forces.” 
It is also recognized that while the same general tendencies may operate 
differently in different places, they continue to be “both embedded in and 
part of wider regulatory systems” (Peck 1996: 109). The point, in short, is 
not to substitute a conceptual framework in which all outcomes are shaped 
by global factors with one in which locality has total primacy. Rather, it is 
an attempt to see geography itself as historically contingent. The “spatial,” 
as Massey (1994: 2) has observed, is not “some absolute independent 
dimension,” but instead “social relations stretched out.”
If radical economic geographers share a common belief that general 
historic forces tend to play out differently in different spatial contexts, there 
is little unity of thought when it comes to identifying the general forces at 
play. There is disagreement as to whether labour campaigns conducted at 
the local level are progressive or regressive strategies. In the United States, 
Herod (1991, 1994), Peet (1983) and Johns (1998) have all argued that 
“capital flight” to non-union, low-wage areas has been the key factor in the 
deindustrialization of the old labour “heartlands.” To rectify this situation, 
Herod (2001: 409) believes, organized labour needs to adopt “a model which 
focuses not upon the global scale of worker organization but, instead, upon 
the very local scale of organization.” Both Herod’s  “deindustrialization” 
thesis and his support for a local model of organizing have, however, been 
subject to refutation. Martin, Sunley and Wills (1994: 62) have concluded 
that the empirical evidence does not support the thesis that “capital flight” 
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is a “major cause” of either “regional or local deindustrialization.” They 
are also dismissive of Herod’s call for “place-specific campaigns to defend 
local jobs,” observing that such campaigns will merely result in further job 
competition “between different groups of workers” (Martin, Sunley and 
Wills 1994: 64). Echoing such sentiments, Peck (1996: 255) has remarked: 
“Localization is critically connected to the weakening of labour’s  bargaining 
strength.”
Where Herod has focused on the potential for workers to remould their 
own geography, Harvey (2001: 323) has emphasized how capitalism strives 
“to create a social and physical landscape . . . requisite to its own needs at 
a particular point in time.” This, Harvey notes, can only occur if capital is 
taken out of circulation and fixed in place. Once embodied in place, how-
ever, capital becomes exposed to devaluation. Whatever the cause, “devalu-
ation is always specific to a particular place and time,” with general crises 
resulting from aggregations of local devaluations (Harvey 1982: 425). For 
Harvey, the desire to escape devaluation provides the key to understanding 
the behaviour of both capital and labour. In each crisis, individual elements 
of capital and labour are confronted with the choice—either “stay in place 
and fight” or “run for the safest havens” (Harvey 1982: 441). Such “fight or 
flight” decisions are shaped, in large part, by the actions of the state. While 
the state may “bring forward” the process of capital devaluation through 
tough monetary or fiscal policies, it not infrequently opts to transfer the 
costs of devaluation from capital to labour by implementing labour laws 
favouring the former (Harvey 1982: 449).
While, as previously indicated, Harvey’s analysis has particular 
 relevance to the mining industry, his work has been criticized for its failure 
to properly consider the ways in which the spatially embodied manifesta-
tions of capital can be contested by labour. Massey (1994: 140), for example, 
has noted that in Harvey’s work “it seems, only capital can win.” In this 
regard, the recent work of Johns (1998) provides a useful addition to the 
literature. While sharing Harvey’s views that “workers cannot win” anything 
but short-term relief from locality struggles, Johns (1998: 268) postulates 
a model that prioritizes international solidarity campaigns whose principal 
aim is the reshaping of capital movements and investment decisions.
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES AND GEOGRAPHIC (OVER)-
EXPANSION
Coal is a low-value commodity that has historically been consumed 
close to the point of production. While 88 per cent of the world’s coal is 
still consumed locally (IEA 1998: I.221), from the 1960s both Central 
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Queensland and western Canada were drawn into a global revolution in the 
consumption and production of coal. On the demand side, the key factor in 
this revolution was the appetite of the Japanese steel mills (JSM) and power 
utilities who, by 2001, were importing a record 155 million tonnes of  product 
(Tex Report 2002). On the supply side, new market needs demanded new 
production systems, as underground mining proved incapable of  producing 
large volumes at low cost. The key development on this front was the 
adoption of highly capitalized opencut mining, techniques perfected by the 
US-based Utah Corporation. In 1965, this latter company signed long-term 
contracts to provide coking coal to the JSM from Central Queensland’s 
Bowen Basin. In western Canada, the lure of long-term  contracts was even 
more significant in enticing producers into the market, given that mining 
areas were over 1,100 kilometres from deep-water. After Kaiser Resources’ 
negotiation, in 1968, of the first long-term contract to supply the JSM from 
the Elk Valley of British Columbia (BC), western Canada’s coal industry 
experienced a rapid revival. Whereas, in 1968, BC’s output was just 900,000 
tonnes, by 1998 the western provinces of BC and Alberta were shipping 
34.2 million tonnes (Coal Association of Canada 1998).
The creation of new patterns of production and consumption in the 
Pacific Basin coal rested, in the first instance, upon the implementation 
of investment strategies forged between buyers, producers and provincial 
and federal governments. Significantly, organized labour had no role in 
this process. In Central Queensland, successive conservative governments 
engaged in what Galligan (1989: 70) has described as  “development 
 boosterism,” underwriting the construction of new railways, ports
and townships. In western Canada, the provision of state-funded  infrastructure 
was vital, given the region’s locational disadvantage. To subsidize western 
Canada’s entry into the market in the face of spatial barriers, the  Canadian 
and BC governments expended in excess of Can$2 billion to create “one 
of the finest transportation and port systems in the world”  (Marshall 
1991: 43). In undertaking such expenditure, in 1976 the BC  Minister for 
 Economic Development advised Japanese buyers that federal and provincial 
 governments were determined “to keep the price of Canadian coal exports 
competitive” (cited, Dames and Moore 1977: 37). Much of this state 
 funding was used to foster mining in the isolated Tumbler Ridge region of
 North-East BC, where the Quinette and Bullmoose mines began 
 production in the early 1980s. However, the remoteness of these mines, 
and of  subsequent operations developed in the Grande Cache region of the 
Alberta foothills, meant that their survival—even with state support—was
dependent upon the JSM’s willingness to pay a premium for their
output.
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Although developmental costs in both western Canada and Central 
Queensland were substantially underwritten by the state, there remained 
a competitive pecking order based upon locational advantage. In has been 
estimated (IEA 1998: I.166; McCloseky 1997: 59) that in 1997 the combined 
rail, port and shipping cost of transporting a tonne of coal from Central 
Queensland, via Dalrymple Bay, to Japan amounted to US$22.22. By 
contrast, on average it cost western Canadian producers, shipping through 
Vancouver’s Roberts Bank facility, US$28.34 to transport a tonne of coal 
to the same market. For producers in North East BC and Alberta export-
ing through the northern port of Prince Rupert the costs would have been 
even higher. To retain western Canadian producers in the market, Japanese 
 buyers deliberately placed them “at the high cost end of the Japanese supply 
portfolio” (Marshall 1991: 37). As a result, Canadian operators received on 
average US$10–15 per tonne more than their Australian counterparts. These 
pricing practices created a dual dichotomy within the spatial structures of 
the Pacific Rim coal trade. Not only were Canadian producers subsidized 
in order to offset locational disadvantage, there also existed within Canada 
what Marshall (1991: 37) has referred to as a “two price system,” as pro-
ducers around Tumbler Ridge and in the Alberta foothills obtained higher 
prices than those in the Elk Valley.
The combined effect of state infrastructure support and differential 
pricing had a number of long-term consequences for labour relations in both 
countries. Firstly, it created an initial period of high returns; a fact dem-
onstrated when, in 1977, Utah announced the largest profit ever recorded 
in Australian financial history (Galligan 1989: 15). In such circumstances, 
there was little incentive to engage in industrial confrontations with mine-
site workforces that would interrupt supply. Secondly, this process resulted, 
as the Japanese buyers intended, in an increasing over-supply of the market 
as a result of economic and geographic over-expansion. Finally, the process 
of geographic expansion ensured that, if price differentials were discontin-
ued, then those operations based in the Alberta foothills and around Tumbler 
Ridge in British Columbia would be particularly vulnerable.
“THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONSTRAINT”: PERMANENT 
WORKFORCES AND LABOUR ORGANIZATION
While organized labour was excluded from the investment processes 
that provided the economic framework within which the export coal  industry 
developed, the industrial and social problems associated with creating new 
workforces soon overshadowed all other operational issues. As early as 
1976, one Canadian study observed that “manpower recruitment and train-
ing” were “the most significant constraint to the development of the coal 
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resource” (Technical Committee 1976: 15). In both Central Queensland 
and western Canadian the obstacles to overcoming these constraints were 
 considerable. In 1966, the population of the Central Queensland coalfields 
area was less than 8,000, while the town of Blackwater, adjacent to Utah’s 
first mine, was described “as a whistle-stop of the lowest order” (cited 
 Galligan 1989: 83). In western Canada, the problems associated with 
 building and maintaining a skilled labour force was, if anything, even 
greater. In North East BC, mining development occurred in a virtual wilder-
ness. Even in the historic Elk Valley mining centre of Michel there were, 
in 1961, a mere 417 residents (Hedum Menzies 1969: 67–68).
In dealing with the constraints imposed by labour shortages, Canadian 
and Queensland producers pursued an identical strategy, working with local 
governments to develop the infrastructure capable of supporting large per-
manent workforces. As one Canadian study observed, “every mine asked the 
communities to develop more land and infrastructure for housing to meet 
increases in the number of employees required to produce the additional 
coal. Each company wanted quality, affordable housing available to attract 
a good workforce” (Marshall 1991: 74).
Although, in both regions, the costly process of assembling resident 
workforces can be attributed, in part, to remoteness, the latter cannot fully 
explain the owners’ actions. For, after all, mining, whether for coal or  hard-
rock, has long been associated with various forms of contract labour and 
impermanent shanty towns. That this did not occur in the developmental 
stage of the export industry can be attributed to three factors, in addition 
to labour market remoteness. Principally, in underwriting development, 
both Canadian and Australian governments had done so with the explicit 
intention, as one Canadian study noted, of fostering “significant regional 
development based on coal exports” (Technical Committee 1976: 349). For 
these governments, the establishment of permanent townships was the quid 
pro quo for their  investment in the industry. As well, opencut mining for 
the supply of export markets was entering virgin territory, both technically 
and geographically. Given the costs and expertise involved, there were few 
companies, other than the actual producers, who possessed the capacity to 
assemble mining equipment and associated labour on a large scale in the 
required locations. Additionally, owners soon found themselves dealing with 
entrenched labour movements who soon demonstrated an ability to shape 
industrial  developments.
Except for the wilderness areas of North East British Columbia, the 
export sector in both Queensland and Canada was superimposed over a land-
scape where underground miners, and their unions, had long been active. In 
Central Queensland, the miners who laboured in the underground pits that 
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dotted the Bowen Basin’s fringes were “renowned” for their “staunch union 
loyalty” (Thomas 1986: 99). Similarly, coal mining in the Alberta-British 
Columbia border regions produced what Langford and Frazer (2002: 49) 
have described as a “strong, indigenous socialist workers movement.” In 
Queensland, these labour traditions were primarily embodied in the  Miners’ 
Federation, now the Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union 
(CFMEU). Prior to 1996, the latter’s organizing task benefited from the 
fact that all Australian employment operated within the confines of federal 
or state “awards.” Between 1946 and 1995 coal miners found themselves 
in a particularly privileged position, as a separate Coal Industry Tribunal 
oversaw their conditions. This strength, however, was also the Achilles 
heel of Australian unions, given that their right to represent  workers was 
embodied within this framework. Meanwhile, in western Canada, the United 
Mineworkers of America (UMWA), the United Steelworkers of America 
(USWA) and the International Union of Operating Engineers (IUOE) 
all sought the loyalty of coal miners. Of these latter unions, the USWA 
proved the most successful. Despite falling employment, as late as 2001 
the USWA still represented two-thirds of the sector’s unionized workforce 
(USWA 2001). Collectively, the Canadian coal unions imposed standard-
ized employment conditions across the export pits. While the Elk Valley’s 
Line Creek mine began in 1981 on a “staff employment” basis, it was soon 
unionized. Similarly, although Fording’s Greenhills mine reopened in 1993 
as a non-union concern, employment was regulated by an Employee Hand-
book that mirrored arrangements elsewhere (Interviews 2002). For all three 
unions there was, as one USWA representative emphasized, “total union 
opposition to the contracting out of ‘bread and butter’ areas of employ-
ment” (Hunt 2001).
SECURING REGULATION: CONTRACTORS AND 
 COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT PROVISIONS TO 1996
If the “most significant constraint” confronting both Central Queensland 
and western Canada producers during the initial export era was a shortage 
of labour, this problem was particularly pronounced during unscheduled 
breakdowns, “spike” maintenance periods and infrastructure construction. In 
such circumstances, employers quickly realized the benefits of  negotiating 
industrial agreements that would guarantee them access to contractors 
during such periods of peak demand. In Central Queensland, the first 
such agreement occurred in July 1974, when Utah agreed that any use of 
 contractors would be preceded by discussions with union representatives. 
This was followed by the negotiation of a framework agreement with the 
 Queensland Coal Owners’ Association—the Queensland Maintenance and 
Bowden-pages490.indd   498 2004-10-07   14:56:15
Process Black
499THE TIES OF PLACE
Minor  Construction Agreement (QBOR 1975). Under the agreement’s terms, 
there were only three circumstances where contractors could be used. Firstly, 
there was work requiring “a significant short-term increase in  manning.” Then, 
there was work that involved the use of technologies “not readily available.” 
Thirdly, there were conditions where “particular skills” were required on “a 
limited basis.” In all circumstances, union  representatives were to be given six 
weeks notice. In addition, contractors’  employees were obliged to join “the 
same union as their employed  counterparts” (BHP-Utah 1988). If the Agree-
ment ensured that any contracting out of work occurred within a regulated 
environment, it was also effective in keeping the use of contractors to a mini-
mum. As late as 1996, the number of contractors and their employees work-
ing within the region’s opencut mines amounted to a mere 416  individuals, 
compared to an employee workforce of 6,665 (QDNRM 2003).
In western Canada, coal unions were also successful in imposing, 
through collective bargaining, a regulatory regime that closely resembled the 
one established in Central Queensland. While pre-1990 copies of collective 
agreements have, unfortunately, not been preserved, oral testimony suggests 
that more recent agreements replicate earlier understandings. Between 1994 
and 2002, for example, the collective agreements negotiated at the Fording 
River (1996, 2001), Quinette (1994, 1997), Line Creek (1997, 2001), and 
Elkview mines (1994, 1997, 2000) in BC, and the Smokey River (1995) 
and Luscar (Cardinal River 1998) mines in Alberta, all contained  provisions 
identical, or similar to, the following: “The Company and the Union
agree that contracting out of work performed by employee in the 
 bargaining unit will not be done for the purpose of laying off, demoting,
terminating, or deferring the recall of bargaining unit employees” (Quinette 
1995: 5).
In addition to such motherhood statements, all agreements provided 
for regular reviews (normally monthly) of all contracting out proposals 
by a “contracting out committee,” or equivalent. These committees were 
entrusted with the task of considering, in the words of successive Fording 
River agreements (1996, 2001), “the use of contractors at the mine site with 
a view to promoting their mutual interest of placing primary reliance on the 
Company’s employees consistent with sound business practice.” Where it 
was determined that specific tasks would be contracted out, unions were 
to receive appropriate advance notice (normally 30 days), including details 
about the proposed contractor and the anticipated number of the contractor’s 
employees who would be on-site (Luscar 2000; Smokey River 1995). At 
some mines, such as Alberta’s Smokey River (1995: 1.01), this process of 
notification included a further discussion of “all options” for “directing the 
work towards employees.”
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DIVERGENCE IN PATTERNS OF REGULATION, 1996–2002: 
AMORTIZATION AND GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION IN 
WESTERN CANADA
Although, prior to 1996, there were marked similarities in the negoti-
ated agreements that determined how contractors were employed in both 
Central Queensland and western Canada, from this point practices rapidly 
diverged, as Australian producers sought “unfettered use of contractors” 
while their Canadian counterparts did not. In large part, this divergence 
reflected the different geographic placement of each region in the Pacific 
Rim coal trade, and a corresponding variance in coal owner strategies. As 
coal prices fell by 18 per cent during 1996, all producers were forced to 
review how this placement affected their operations. For western Canadian 
producers, the fundamental problem remained distance from market. As one 
industry journal reported in 1998: “Western Canadian mines have demon-
strated high productivity, but are at a competitive disadvantage to Australian 
mines because of the long distances between mines and ports” (Carrington 
1998: 66). In such circumstances, the industry’s woes could not be rem-
edied simply through productivity improvements or labour reforms. Indeed, 
Canada’s placement at the high cost end of supply occurred despite the fact 
that, by 1997, mine-site labour costs averaged just US$4.60  compared to 
an Australian average of US$11.90 in 1996 (IEA 1998: I 204–05). There 
were, however, limited possibilities for further gains in this area. On the 
productivity front, BC producers lagged behind their Queensland rivals, 
despite the annual output of each BC miner increasing from 4,310 to 6,619 
tonnes between 1990 and 1996 (BCMEM 2003). Again, geography worked 
against Canadian operators, as Queensland’s superior productivity (where 
each miners’ annual output averaged 9,221 tonnes in 1995–96) largely 
reflected the use of large-capacity draglines. While such machinery could 
be used with ease on Queensland’s central plains, on the mountaintops of 
western Canada they could be rarely utilized, forcing owners to resort to less 
efficient truck-shovel methods. On the wages front, Canadian producers also 
had little room to manoeuvre, given that, in 1996, the US$40,300 received 
by the average Canadian coal miner was well below the US$58,400 paid to 
his Australian counterpart (IEA 1998: I 204–05). Here, Canadian producers 
were caught in a hard place, as the need to pay a “premium” to maintain 
suitable workers in remote locations limited their capacity to reduce labour 
costs in order to offset locational disadvantage.
As the export coal sector increasingly became a loss-making venture 
in western Canada, both producers and provincial governments faced the 
total amortization of their capital investment in the industry. This was 
particularly the case in the Tumbler Ridge and Grande Cache regions, as 
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the Bullmoose, Quinette and Gregg River mines saw the expiry of long-
term contracts  containing payments “significantly in excess of market 
prices” (Luscar 1999: 13). The inevitable result was the abandonment of 
those operations with the highest transport costs, and an organizational 
and geographic  concentration of the surviving producers in the Elk  Valley. 
Between 1999 and 2002 all export operations outside the Elk Valley 
closed, resulting in the loss of over 1,500 jobs (USWA 2001). In order to 
salvage their remaining coal assets, in February 2003 the three surviving 
Canadian operators—Fording Coal, Tech Cominco and Luscar—agreed 
to the division of the Canadian industry into two cartels. Under the terms 
of a “Non-competition agreement” approved by Alberta’s Court of the 
Queen’s Bench, the newly-established Fording Coal Partnership acquired 
all of western Canada’s coking coal assets, with the right to manage these 
resources free of competition from its former rivals. In consequence, the 
Partnership secured the Elk Valley’s entire annual output of 25 million 
tonnes (Fording Coal 2003).
The concentration of the western Canadian industry on the Elk Valley 
had a major regional economic impact. In commenting on the closure of 
Alberta’s Smokey River mine, for example, the mayor of nearby Grande 
Cache observed: “The mine is Grande Cache’s biggest employer by far, 
so this is going to be devastating” (Edmonton Journal 27 February 2000: 
A7). However, for those miners who retained their jobs in the Elk Valley, 
the process of geographic concentration actually strengthened their labour 
market placement. By mid-2002, employment in the Valley’s five mines 
stood at over 2,600—not far short of that for the total BC coal industry two 
years before (Interviews 2002; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001: 10). Given 
that the Valley contained just 13–14,000 people, this presented significant 
recruitment problems. To compound matters, producers also faced competi-
tion for skilled maintenance workers in particular from both the hard-rock 
sector and Alberta’s lucrative “oil-sands” projects (Interviews 2002).
As western Canadian coal owners engaged in the difficult process 
of organizational and geographical concentration there was little interest 
in engaging in industrial conflicts over what were, for them, peripheral 
issues such as outsourcing, particularly given the tightness of the labour 
market in their remaining operational area. On the contrary, during the 
crisis period 1996–2001 all mining companies reiterated their support for 
historic labour practices. Thus a senior Executive of one company observed 
during 2001, that co-operative union-management relationships remained a 
“given” (Interview 2001a). Emphasizing this point, by 2001 all of the Elk 
Valley’s major unionized operations had renegotiated long-term collective 
agreements which replicated earlier restrictions on the use of contractors 
(Line Creek 2001; Fording River 2001; Elkview 2001). In addition, four 
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of the five Elk Valley mines, including the non-union Greenhills operation, 
maintained a “no lay-off” policy during the worst of the downturn. Rather 
than resorting, as their Australian counterparts did, to widespread use of 
outsourcing, mine management negotiated job-sharing and leave arrange-
ments with their workforces (Interviews 2002).
DIVERGENCE IN CENTRAL QUEENSLAND: IN SITU 
EMPLOYER STRATEGIES AND THE ENGAGEMENT OF 
CONTRACTORS
Where western Canadian coal owners’ primary response to falling com-
modity prices involved the spatial reorganization of the industry in order 
to offset locational disadvantage, the problems and responses of Australian 
producers were radically different. As previously noted, in 1997 Central 
Queensland producers possessed, on average, a US$6.12 per tonne transport 
advantage over their Canadian competitors. However, by 1996–97, average 
mine-site labour costs in Australia were US$7.20 per tonne higher than they 
were in Canada. This effectively meant that the entire locational advantage 
of Australian producers had been “captured” by the workforce. While, for 
employers, this could be overlooked during periods of high price, their 
forbearance disappeared as prices fell. Given Central Queensland’s continu-
ing locational advantage, there was little consideration given to large-scale 
mine closures in the opencut sector. These remained extremely valuable 
assets that needed to be defended through in situ strategies that focused on 
a lowering of labour costs.
As producers contemplated a major overhaul of their work practices, 
an increase usage of contractors offered three perceived benefits. It reduced 
direct capital costs, since, as the head of Peabody Resources noted, the 
practice normally involved “contractors supplying their own equipment” 
(Humphries 1998: 3). In contrast to the industry’s developmental era, there 
were now a number of companies willing to undertake large-scale contract 
mining work. As one such firm, Roche Mining, noted in its corporate maga-
zine during mid-2000: “Roche has actively targeted the coal sector, which 
represents a big market with a small contractor penetration” (Newsfront 
June 2000: 5). Contracting out also provided a mechanism for the intro-
duction of new work arrangements such as longer shifts and reduced crew 
levels. Perhaps most significantly it provided a “change agent” for forcing 
industrial change on the wider workforce. Nevertheless, any extension in 
the use of contractors in Central Queensland remained problematic while 
those factors that underpinned the Maintenance and Minor Construction 
Agreement—entrenched union presence, centralized industrial relations 
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legislation that guaranteed union coverage and the tightness of the regional 
labour market—remained in force.
Given the capacity of mining unions to block extensions in the use 
of contractors within the industrial framework that existed prior to 1996, 
this issue became inextricably linked to a campaign by Queensland’s coal 
owners for dramatic changes to national labour laws. Among the coal 
owners, CRA/Rio Tinto played a particularly significant role. In 1991, for 
example, CRA’s Leigh Clifford advised other coal company executives 
that “a major change was needed in Queensland industrial policy.” Such 
changes, he argued, were required to shift the focus “away from centralized 
negotiation of industrial issues at state and national level” to “individual site 
discussions” (Grubb 1991). In taking this stance, Clifford was reflecting his 
company’s preference for workplaces where trade unions were excluded 
from any meaningful role. As Peetz (2002: 252) has noted, in Australia the 
implementation of a “decollectivist model” emerged “initially through the 
operations of companies in the CRA/Rio Tinto group.” During the early 
1990s, this model was forcefully implemented in a number of the company’s 
non-coal operations, most notably New Zealand’s Tiwai Point refinery and 
Australia’s Bell Bay and Boyne Island aluminium smelters.
By April 1992, CRA’s insistence on the need for radical change had 
won the support of the Queensland Coal Owners’ Industrial Organiza-
tion, who accepted a five-year strategy to bring about an “uncentralized 
and site focused industrial relations model within the industry” (IRSAG 
1994: 1). Significantly, an increase in “contractors and outsourcing” was 
identified as one of the sought after “changes in behaviour and resultant 
working arrangements” (IRSAG 1994: 16). To implement this strategy, it 
was agreed that the industry’s peak councils should actively support radical 
legislative change. In 1993, the coal owners’ federal body, the Australian 
Coal Association, duly took up the baton, informing the federal  government 
that: “Reform is urgently needed in the coal industry” (ACA 1993). Intel-
lectual endorsement for radical change also came from the conservative 
H. R. Nichols Society. In one of its earliest publications, the Society noted 
that producers’ capacity to respond to the “squeeze action between rising 
costs and falling prices” was constrained by “peace at any price” labour 
laws (Larratt 1988: 62). Only by removing these constraints, it was argued, 
could the coal industry prosper.
For Queensland’s coal owners, the passage of the WRA in December 
1996 represented the vital breakthrough. As CRA’s historian (Ludeke 1996: 
45) observed at the time: “The environment which will be introduced by the 
new law will challenge the foundations of union structures in Australia.” 
Such proved to be the case. On 10 January 1997, with the new act in its 
infancy, management at Rio Tinto’s Blair Athol mine declared that it would 
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no longer require contractors’ employees to join a union (Bates 1997). In 
July 1997, management went further, giving “notice of our intention to with-
draw from the Maintenance and Minor Construction Agreement” (McCrea 
1997). Despite a series of bitter conflicts, by early 2001 the CFMEU was 
forced to concede defeat, agreeing to a new Certified Agreement which 
stipulated management’s right to use contractors “on any work as required” 
(AIRC 2001a).
Following Rio Tinto’s success, other employers were quick to follow 
suit. In January 2001, BHP Coal advised unions of its intention to enforce 
its “right to free and unfettered use of contractors” at all its Queensland 
operations (BHP Coal 2001). When the subsequent Enterprise Agreement 
was ratified, these words were replicated without modification (AIRC 
2001b). No longer constrained by formal agreements, employers dramati-
cally restructured their workforce through the engagement of contractors. 
As Table 1 indicates, between 1996 and 2002 the number of contractors 
and their employees engaged in Central Queensland’s opencut mines 
increased six-fold to 2,480. During the same period, the number of direct 
mine employees declined from 6,665 to 3,954.
TABLE 1
Employees and Contractors (and their Employees), Central Queensland’s 
Opencut Mines, 1996–2002
Year Employees Contractors
1996 6,665 416
1998 4,355 1,002
2000 3,373 1,027
2001 4,203 1,954
2002 3,954 2,480
Source: Statistical Office, Queensland Department of Natural Resources and 
Mines.
Socially, the increased use of contractors appears to have contributed 
significantly to a sharp fall in the coalfields’ population, which fell from 
42,571 to 40,789 between 1996 and 2001. By the 2001 census night, more 
than 28 percent of homes in the mining towns of Dysart and Middlemount 
were abandoned or otherwise unoccupied. In Collinsville and Blackwater, 
the percentages were 23.9 and 18.8 percent respectively (QDLGP 2001: 
4, 21). Industrially, there is also little doubt that the removal of earlier 
restrictions on contractors assisted coal owners in reducing costs. Between 
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1995–96 and 1999–2000 total employment in the Queensland coal industry, 
including “on site” contractors, fell from 10,962 to 7,972, while saleable 
output per employee per year almost doubled, rising from 7,709 to 14,483 
tonnes (Coal Services 2001: Table 1). While statistical evidence on mine-site 
labour costs remains unavailable at an industry level, Rio Tinto reported 
gains of US$6–7 per tonne at its NSW Hunter Valley No. 1 mine  (Australian 
Mining 1999: 9). If such gains were, in fact, replicated throughout the indus-
try, they would represent an employer recapture of the locational advantage 
surrendered to their workforce during the period of high price.
If the WRA enabled Central Queensland’s coal owners to create a new 
employment regime, employers were less successful in overcoming the 
union loyalties of the region’s workforce. As other barriers to the use of 
contractors diminished, these loyalties provided employers with their most 
significant obstacle to the unregulated use of outsourcing. This, in turn, 
appears to reflect the fact that contracting out in Central Queensland did not 
lead to the general displacement of the mining workforce, as miners opted 
to work for contractors rather than leave the industry. Thus, while official 
statistics do indicate a movement of displaced miners to coastal towns such 
as Mackay (QDLGP 2001), anecdotal evidence also suggests that a signifi-
cant proportion, if not a majority, of those engaged by contractors were 
redundant coal miners (Interviews 2003). While accurate figures on union 
density rates among contractors’ employee are also unavailable, CFMEU 
activists employed by contractors have estimated that 85 per cent of such 
workers are union members (Interviews 2001b). Significantly, by 2000 it 
appeared as if the process of redundancy and contracting out initiated by the 
WRA was losing momentum. While the number of contractors employed in 
Central Queensland’s opencut mines more than doubled between 2000 and 
2002 to reach a record 2,480, the number of directly employed miners also 
rose from 3,373 in 2000 to 4,203 a year later. Overall, the total engaged 
Queensland workforce rebounded strongly after 2000, growing by approxi-
mately 25 percent from 8,105 to 10,205. Partly reflecting this reversal, in 
the year to September 2002, productivity in Queensland coalmines fell by 
a record 13.78 per cent (QDNRM 2002). While it is unclear whether this 
marked productivity decline is associated with growing difficulties in man-
aging contract miners, any early return to the pre-1996 reliance on directly 
engaged workforces appears unlikely.
LABOUR STRATEGIES AND RESPONSES
While the different strategies pursued by Canadian and Queensland 
coal owners in reaction to falling prices reflected, in large part, their  spatial 
placement in the Pacific Rim coal trade, organized labour’s responses 
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remained embedded within national regulatory systems. In western Canada, 
the USWA’s principal concern during the post-1996 downturn was that 
there should be no surrender of the “cornerstones” of [business] unionism 
– job seniority, work demarcation lines, and restrictions on contracting 
(Hunt 2001). While USWA membership in the sector fell from 2,445 in 
1996 to 1,210 in 2001 (USWA 2001), the union was prepared to acquiesce 
in mine closures rather than see Locals engage in concession bargaining 
(Hunt 2001). Thus, when Alberta’s Smokey River mine closed, the principal 
grievance of the USWA Local was the lack of “notification” that would 
have allowed miners to “look for a job” (Edmonton Journal 27 February 
2000: A7). In part, this stance reflected the USWA’s view that issues of 
investment and economic policy were ones best handled through its affili-
ation to the New Democratic Party. This is not to say that the union was 
blind to the changes being wrought by global economic activities. Indeed, 
the union imposed a levy on all members for a Humanity Fund aimed at 
assisting workers in developing countries avoid a “race to the bottom” 
(Hunt 2001). In evaluating possible union responses to international “spatial 
competition,” however, Johns (1998: 258–9) would categorize this latter 
strategy as representing a “classic protectionist view,” given that its principal 
object is to protect local jobs by raising costs elsewhere. Such a viewpoint, 
she believes, remains fundamentally incapable of “challenging the spatial 
organization of global production (Johns 1998: 269).
Whereas the principal reaction of the USWA to their industry’s  spatial 
reorganization was the protection of traditional collective bargaining 
standards and practices, the major response of Australian coal unions to 
the increased usage of contractors was also found in the industrial arena. In 
mid-1995 the CFMEU finally accepted that it was no longer in a position 
to exclude contactors from core mining activities, resolving instead “that 
an active recruitment campaign of contractors be immediately initiated 
(CFMEU 1995: 375). These campaigns resulted in the larger contract-
ing companies being covered by industrial agreements, even under the 
adverse conditions applying under the WRA (see, for example, AIRC 2002). 
 However, the industrial impact of these new agreements was diluted by 
their failure to contain any provisions dealing with the actual contracting 
out process. Thus, in negotiating an agreement with a contractor at the large 
Goonyella-Riverside mine, the union conceded him the unrestricted right 
“to contract out the functions such as major plant repairs, refurbishment and 
servicing, and component change-outs, drill and blast, and rehabilitation 
work” (AIRC 2002). While such agreements were, by themselves, incapable 
of restoring security of employment, the unions were even less successful in 
organizing solidarity campaigns at either the local or global level. Among 
miners forced into working for contractors, the lack of support from local 
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politicians and shopkeepers was particularly galling (Interviews 2001). 
Similarly, although the CFMEU played a formative role in the Coalition of 
Rio Tinto Shareholders, and established alliances with international unions 
covering miners employed by Rio Tinto, these actions did little more than 
publicize Rio Tinto’s unenviable labour relations record (Bowden 2000: 
378–9).
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the responses of Central 
 Queensland and western Canadian unions to the crises that beset their 
industry is their failure to engage with each other. Despite the fact that 
Queensland and Canada have been competitors in the export coal trade since 
the 1970s, there has been no significant trans-Pacific union dialogue. In 
consequence, unions in each region have remained ignorant of even the most 
basic industrial developments in the other. There has, as a result, been no 
discussion of joint industrial action to exploit employer vulnerability during 
annual price negotiations with buyers. Nor has there been any discussion 
of the ways in which Australian and Canadian unions can collaborate to 
influence investment and pricing arrangements.
CONCLUSION
In 1848, Marx and Engels (1951: 36) made a famous observation that 
capitalism dissolved “fixed, fast-frozen relations” to such an extent that: 
“All that is solid melts into air.” Yet, while their analysis foreshadowed 
much of the recent literature on capital mobility (Herod 1991, 1994, 2001), 
in exploring variations in the regulation of contractors in the export coal 
sectors of western Canada and Central Queensland this article supports 
Harvey’s contrary thesis (1982: 425, 441) that capital, once fixed in place, 
cannot be moved without exposure to devaluation. This general rule, it is 
argued, is of particular importance in mining. For, as Rio Tinto’s Chairman 
observed in 1999: “Once capacity has been created, it is very difficult to 
remove” (Wilson 1999: 3). In the current study, the difficulty in removing 
fixed capital, even during deteriorating economic circumstances, mani-
fested itself in a process of geographic over-expansion. This geographic 
over-expansion did not stem, however, from the “invisible hand” of market 
forces but rather from deliberate investment decisions made by producers, 
governments and buyers from the 1960s onwards. Significantly, organized 
labour was not involved in this investment process. While the demand 
for coal from Japan’s steel mills provided the impetus for development, 
 provincial governments in both western Canada and Queensland played the 
decisive role in overcoming the spatial barriers between coal resources and 
markets through their construction of ports, railways and social infrastruc-
ture. By subsidizing private development, however, state policies fostered 
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the  extension of mining into economically marginal fields. Although, in 
the short term, producer profitability was guaranteed, this geographic over-
extension was at the root cause of the crisis of over-supply that was clearly 
evident by the 1990s.
The responses of the Queensland and Canadian export producers to 
the crises of over-supply differed profoundly according to differences in 
their special placement. For Canadian owners, the key issue was locational 
 disadvantage, due to the distance of mining operations from deep-water 
ports. In consequence, Canadian owners reacted to falling prices by concen-
trating mining operations in the most favourable location, the Elk Valley. 
Given the scale of this restructuring exercise, employers had little incen-
tive to engage in industrial battles over what were, for them, peripheral 
labour issues such as the use of contractors. As a result, previously negoti-
ated restrictions on the use of contractors remained in force. By contrast, 
Queensland producers were forced to deal with the industrial consequences 
of superior location. In essence, Central Queensland employers had allowed, 
during the period of high profitability, their entire transport advantage vis-à-
vis western Canada to accrue to their workforce via higher mine-site labour 
costs. To alter this situation required a radical transformation of employment 
relations. As a result, from 1992 Queensland coal owners became active 
supporters of a major overhaul of Australian labour laws; a campaign that 
was crowned with success following the passage of the WRA in December 
1996. The decisive impact of the WRA in transforming labour relations is 
particularly evident in the use of contractors, as the numbers engaged rose 
from minuscule levels in 1996 to more one-third of the workforce just four 
years later.
The significance of spatial configurations in shaping employers’ labour 
strategies in both western Canada and Central Queensland emphasizes the 
need to conceptualize place not just as a local, physical manifestation but 
also as a set of social relations that play out simultaneously at all spatial 
levels, including the global and national. Although global processes play 
out differently in different national and local contexts, as Peck (1996: 250) 
notes, “many of the determinants of local success or failure continue to 
be exogenous not endogenous.” Thus, while organized labour was, in the 
current study, capable of exerting considerable influence over the ways 
in which employment relations were configured at the local level prior 
to 1996, these local strategies remained at the mercy of global forces. In 
these circumstances, while scholars such as Herod are correct in emphasiz-
ing the importance of local campaigns, there remains a need to transcend 
such mobilizations by linking them to wider struggles capable of influenc-
ing the investment processes through which capital takes material form. 
In this regard, Harvey’s analysis, which emphasizes the ways in which 
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 capital must remained fixed in place if it is not to be devalued, highlights 
the  opportunities and challenges inherent in any place-based production
system. For, as Harvey (2001: 360) observes: “The accumulation of  capital 
has always been a profoundly geographical affair.” As the geography of 
capital becomes increasingly global, so too must be the geography of 
labour.
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RÉSUMÉ
Les liens du site : les stratégies des employeurs et des sous-
traitants dans les mines de l’Ouest canadien et du Queensland 
central
En 1892, Alfred Marshall se demandait « comment la tendance à la 
variation en affaire devient la cause principale du progrès ? ». Il est vrai, 
cependant, que ce n’est pas une tâche facile de chercher à expliquer les 
modèles de variation. Comme Marshall le faisait remarquer (1932 : 205) : 
« chaque localité présente des événements qui lui sont propres et qui 
influencent de bien des manières les méthodes du type d’affaires qu’on y 
poursuit ». Cet essai cherche à comprendre les façons dont la géographie 
et le lieu ont pu façonner les diverses stratégies de relations industrielles 
adoptées depuis le milieu des années 90 par les producteurs et exportateurs 
de charbon dans le Queensland central et dans l’Ouest canadien.
Les différences sont surtout apparues avec le recours à la sous-traitance. 
Alors que les producteurs de l’Ouest canadien continuaient à s’appuyer sur 
leur main-d’œuvre, dont la caractéristique principale était d’être engagée 
selon les termes de contrats de travail imposant de sérieuses restrictions à 
la sous-traitance, les propriétaires du Queensland central depuis 1996 ont 
renié les ententes antérieures limitant le recours à la sous-traitance. Il en est 
résulté que le nombre de sous-traitants s’est élevé d’un niveau très faible 
pour atteindre jusqu’à un tiers de la main-d’œuvre (QDNRM 2003). De 
telles différences ne peuvent être attribuées uniquement à des forces écono-
miques mondiales, parce que les producteurs du Queensland et du Canada, 
qui dominaient entre autres le commerce international du charbon, vendaient 
le même produit dans des marchés similaires et à un prix identique.
En cherchant à comprendre les différentes stratégies suivies par les 
producteurs du Queensland et de l’Ouest canadien, les exemples fournis par 
les travaux de géographie économique radicale peuvent êtres révélateurs 
et, en particulier, ceux de David Harvey (1982, 1989, 1991). Tout comme 
d’autres (Peet 1983; Herod 1991, 1994) ont mis l’emphase sur la mobilité 
du capital et sa volatilité, Harvey a mis en évidence les manières dont le 
capital productif et également la main-d’œuvre sont géographiquement 
imbriqués. Une fois qu’il est intégré au milieu, le capital devient exposé à 
une dévaluation. C’est ce qui se produit particulièrement dans l’industrie 
des mines, où les investissements en capital deviennent fixés physiquement 
au sol. Ceci comporte deux effets majeurs. D’abord, les opérations ne peu-
vent être déplacées d’un endroit à un autre sans la dépréciation de montants 
importants de capital fixe. Ensuite, cet obstacle à la mobilité du capital crée 
une difficulté face à une réduction éventuelle de l’excédent de production au 
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cours des périodes d’affaissement du prix et de la  profitabilité. Car, comme 
le faisait remarquer le président de Rio Tinto, une des compagnies d’expor-
tation de charbon les plus importantes au monde, « une fois que la capacité 
est installée, il devient très difficile de l’enlever » (Wilson 1999 : 3).
Dans la situation étudiée, la difficulté de déplacer le capital fixe, même 
dans des circonstances de détérioration de l’économie, est apparue au 
cours d’un processus de surdéveloppement géographique. Ceci cependant 
n’originait pas de la « main invisible » des forces du marché, mais plutôt 
de décisions intentionnelles d’investissement par les producteurs, les gou-
vernements et les acheteurs depuis les années 1960 et par la suite. Ce qui 
est significatif, c’est l’absence d’implication des syndicats ouvriers dans le 
processus d’investissement. Alors que la demande de charbon de la part des 
usines japonaises de l’acier incitait au développement, les gouvernements 
provinciaux à la fois au Queensland et dans l’Ouest canadien ont joué un 
rôle décisif en surmontant les barrières spatiales entre les ressources de 
charbon et les marchés par la construction de ports, de chemins de fer et 
d’infrastructures sociales. Cependant, en subventionnant le développement 
privé, les politiques de l’État ont encouragé l’expansion de l’industrie des 
mines dans des champs économiquement marginaux. Quoique, en courte 
période, la profitabilité des producteurs était assurée, cette excroissance 
géographique fut à la racine même de la crise d’un excès de l’offre qui est 
devenu clairement évident vers les années 1990.
Les réactions des producteurs exportateurs du Queensland et de 
l’Ouest du Canada à la crise causée par l’offre excédentaire furent pro-
fondément  différentes, dépendant de leur emplacement spécifique. Pour 
les  propriétaires canadiens, l’enjeu principal a été celui d’un désavantage 
géographique dû à la distance entre les opérations minières et les ports en 
eau profonde. Par exemple, en 1997, le coût moyen agrégé de transport 
d’une tonne de charbon par train et par bateau de l’Ouest canadien vers la 
Baie de Yokohama en utilisant les équipements de la Vancouver’s Robert 
Bank était de 28,34 $ U.S. Par contre, il en coûtait en moyenne aux proprié-
taires du Queensland central seulement 22,22 $ U.S. pour acheminer une 
tonne de charbon au même marché en l’exportant par la Baie de Dalrymple 
(IEA 1998). Par conséquent, les producteurs de l’Ouest canadien ont réagi 
à la chute des prix en concentrant leurs opérations minières dans le site le 
plus avantageux, le Elk Valley. Étant donné l’envergure de l’exercice de 
restructuration, les employeurs n’ont eu que peu d’incitation à livrer des 
batailles industrielles sur ce qui leur apparaissait des enjeux du travail 
marginaux, tel que le recours à des sous-traitants. Ceci s’est traduit par le 
maintien en vigueur des restrictions négociées antérieurement eu égard au 
recours à la sous-traitance.
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Dans le Queensland, les producteurs se sont vus forcés de négocier 
avec les conséquences industrielles d’un site plus avantageux, tellement 
que vers 1996–97 les coûts moyens de main-d’œuvre à l’emplacement de 
la mine en Australie s’élevaient à 7,20 $ de plus par tonne qu’au Canada, 
effaçant ainsi tous les avantages antérieurs dus à l’emplacement (IEA 1998). 
Le fait de vouloir changer une telle situation supposait une modification 
radicale de la relation d’emploi. Ceci s’est à son tour traduit depuis 1992 
par l’appui actif que les propriétaires de mines du Queensland ont accordé 
à une révision majeure des lois du travail en Australie, une campagne qui 
a connu un franc succès par l’adoption du Workplace Relations Act en 
décembre 1996. L’impact décisif de la nouvelle législation apparaît évident 
quand on considère que le recours aux sous-traitants est passé de 416 en 
1996 à 2 480 seulement en six ans, alors que le nombre de mineurs salariés 
a chuté de 6 665 à 3 954 (QDNRM 2003).
L’importance des configurations spatiales dans le façonnement des 
stratégies des employeurs à l’égard de la main-d’œuvre à la fois dans 
l’Ouest canadien et le Queensland central a mis en évidence le besoin de 
penser à un site non seulement en termes local et physique, mais aussi en 
termes de rapports sociaux qui se nouent simultanément à tous les niveaux 
de l’espace, incluant la scène nationale et mondiale.
En admettant que les processus mondiaux agissent différemment selon 
les contextes locaux et nationaux, on doit reconnaître, comme le fait Peck 
(1966 : 250), qu’un nombre imposant de déterminants du succès ou de 
l’échec continue de demeurer exogène et non endogène. Alors, comme le 
travail organisé, objet de la présente étude, était en mesure d’exercer une 
influence considérable sur les différents modes qu’a pris la relation d’em-
ploi au niveau local avant 1996, ces stratégies locales sont demeurées à la 
merci des forces mondiales.
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